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Economic Incentives to Retire:
AQualitative Choice Approach
ABSTRACT
This paper addresses two questions:(1) Are older persons' retirement
ages significantly affected by the opportunities for income from earnings,
private pensions, and Social Security and for leisure at alternative retire-
ment ages?; and (2) How large are the estimated responses?Our approach to
modeling the retirement problem is a forward—looking one, in which the ex-
planatory variables include present discounted values of expected lifetime
income from earnings, private pensions, and Social Security at all future
retirement ages. Such data have been constructed using a unique archiveon
390 workers covered by a large union pension plan. A previouspaper (Fields
and Mitchell, 1982) used these data to show that retirementages are signi-
ficantly associated with the present discounted value of income atage 60, and
with the gain in income from deferring retirement. The currentpaper develops
two different qualitative choice models of the retirement decision. We
find: retirement ages do indeed respond significantly to future income and
leisure opportunities; an ordered logit model is more suited to the data
than is a multinomial logit model; and the estimatedresponses to changes
in future income opportunities differ across model specifications, where
the preferred ordered logit model exhibits larger estimatedresponses.
Olivia S. Mitchell
Gary S. Fields
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Industrial and Labor Relations
Ives Hall
Cornell University
Ithaca, New York 14853
(607) 256—4561I. A Model of Earnings, Private Pensions, Social Security, and Retirement
Building on a well—developed theoretical literature,' we analyze
retirement in a forward—looking intertemporal framework. In essence, older
people are postulated to evaluate the incomes they could receive from
various sources at alternate retirement ages, and also the corresponding
amounts of leisure. These income sources include some or all of the
following:(a) earnings, to the extent people go on working; (b)Social
Security, which covers a majority of the elderly population; (c) private
pensions, for which a large and growing fraction of older workers is
eligible; and (d) wealth. If the older worker defers retirement, he gives
up Social Security and/or private pension benefits during that year; on
the other hand by working longer, he gains another year's earnings, he
lessens the early retirement reduction factor (or adds to the late retirement
credit) associated with Social Security benefits, and if eligible for a
pension, he typically qualifies for a larger annual benefit. In most
circumstances, monetary gains will outweigh monetary losses so that each
extra year of work increases lifetime income. This gain in income adds to
utility but, of course, comes at a cost: he also foregoes leisure. The
worker's choice of retirement age thus depends on the size of these gains
and losses, as well as his valuation of them. Thus, in a sample of workers,
differences in retirement ages will depend on opportunities and tastes for
future income and future leisure.
Let the i'th individual's utility from retiring at age j be a positive,
concave function of the present discounted value of expected lifetime con—
suznption from year zero, the age of the retirement decision, onward (PDVC1)
'Among the clearest theoretical developments are those by Crawford and
Lilien (1981) and Burbidge and Robb (1980). These and other models are
reviewed in Mitchell andFields(1982).
2and of the length of the retirtnent period
(RET):
(1) U1 =U1(PDVC1.,RET1); U1, U2 >
0; U11, U12 <0.1
PDVC1 and RET. are both functions of the retirement age R1. R1 is chosen
to maximize (1) subject to:
(2) PDVC .= PDVY.+W. -B
ij ijio io
where PDVY.isthe present discounted value of expected lifetime income
from the age of the retirement decision onward,W0 is the i'th individual's
wealth in year zero, and B0 is his planned bequest as viewed from year zero.






An individual who retires later gains lifetime income (PDVY) and loses hf e—
time leisure (RET1), and finds it optimal to retire when the utility values
of these gains and losses offset each other.2
The message from the preceding paragraph Is that the optimal retirement
age is determined in a future—oriented intertemporal context.3In addItIon
to leisure, the key explanatory variable is the present discounted value of
expected lifetime income for all future retirement ages from the date of the
retirement decision onward. If there are J possible retirement ages, we
therefore require J PDVY's. The j'th PDVY for individual i is given by:
'For ease of expositionwe abstract from the possibility of part—time
or post—retirement work, neither of which was pursued to any significant
degree in the data sample described below. Variable hours of work are allowed
for in recent models by Custman and Steinmeier (1981) and Burtless and Moffitt
(1982).
21f the left hand side of (3)can in fact be equated to zero, and If the
second order condition is satisfied, the solution is an interior one. But
if, as is possible, the left hand side of (3) is negative for all conceivable
retirement ages, it is optimal to retire immediately.
3Past decisions and events are reflected in current wealth,wages, and
other variables.
3R T
(4) PDVY1J=f 1EjSdt [PPJ + SS] dt,
i
where: Elt is earnings in the t'th year of work; PP and SS are
respectively the private pension beef its and Social Security benefits in
year t, both of which depend on the choice of retirement age R1; and
is a discount factor reflecting time preference and mortality.
In the balance of this paper, we develop an empirical model using




To estimate empirically the determinants of retirement based on the
model of Section I, themost immediate problem is that utility functions are
unobservable. To make headway, we write the i'th individual's utility from
retiring in year j as
(5) =[alogPDVY.. + 8log RET..] +
Here ct and 8areparameters to be estimated by maximumlikelihoodacross the
individuals in our sample. The term in brackets, [cLlàgPDVY1. + 8log RET.]
Is termed the average individual's "strict utility" associated with particular
values PDVY .andRET. .However,thei'th individual's utility function
ij ij
differs from theaverage for a host of unobserved reasons. These unobserved
components may be summarized by a disturbance term in (5), about which
additional distributional assumptions must be made.
At this juncture, two classes of models might be considered by
the econometrician: probit and logit. The probit framework maintains that
the are distributed tnultivariate normally for each individual, but
independently across individuals. While a probit model merits. serious
consideration when the number of choices is no greater than five, we have
nine retirement ages and probit becomes computationally infeasible for
a nine—way choice set) Hence, probit must be rejected for use in the present
context.
A popular alternative is the logit class of models. In these models,
c) are distributed according to the multivariate extreme value
distribution for each individual 1. As McFadden (1978) shows, the function:
(6) F(c1, .. ., c1)exp{_G(e1, ... , ei)}
'Hausman and Wise (1978) discuss size limitations in multi—outcomeprobit
models.6
is a multivariate extreme value distribution. G ( ) isa general function;
below, we present the forms of C C ) corresponding tospecific logit formu—
lations. Equation (6) gives rise toa probabilistic choicemodel
V V V V V
(7) P =eG.(e ,... , e)/G(e ,.. . , e),
where P. is the probability that retirementage j is chosen and V. is the•
strict utility associated with alternative j, i.e., the bracketedterm in (5).
The general class of logits given by (7) is knownas the Generalized Extreme
Value (GEV) framework.
A simple representative of the GEV class, and theone used most ex-







(9) G(y, ...,y) E y4,
J=lJ
V4 where y., a function of attributes of choice j for individual.1, is equal to e
The main attraction of the MNL model is its computationalsimplicity.
However, INL possesses a
property known as Independence from Irrelevant Alter-
natives (hA),, which states that the relative odds forany two alternatives
are independent either of the attributes or of the availability ofany other
alternative. hA denies the possibility that son individualsare "workaholics"
and others are "leisure—lovers." We havestrong reason to believe that the
error termcis correlated with the error term cfor two retirement ages im in
m and n near one another, but this correlation is not allowed in the MNL model.
Rather than imposing hA, we prefer to work with models that allowerror
terms to correlated for a given Individual and to test for hAformally.Ordered logit models enable us to do this, since they recognize that in
manyqualitativechoice contexts, alternatives can be ordered along a
natural dimension. The pathbreaking work on ordered logit was done by
Small (1981, 1982), who considered the decision of how late or early to
arrive at work. In the retirement context, the retirement age may also be
ordered from early to late. It is useful to model this ordering explicitly.
A Simple Ordered Logit model (SOL) maintains that the attractiveness of
any given alternative depends upon the attributes of immediately adjacent
alternatives as well as of the specific alternative in question. For
example, a workaholic has a higher probability under SOL than under NNL
of choosing the next closest late retirement age, and likewise a leisure—
lover is given a higher probability of choosing the next closest early retire-
ment age. Intuitively, the SOL model tilts the structure of probabilities in
one direction or the other as compared with the MNL model. This is achieved
by developing a G function of the form:
(10) C(y1, ..., y)E (yh/P + y'),
where iS an index of independence of adjacent alternatives. Whenpl,hA
holds; p0 corresponds to identical alternatives.
From (7) and (10), the choice probabilities for the SOL model can be
written as
V /PV. 11P V IPP—l V /p V.1f p p—i




(Note: For j =0and j =J+l,take e =0.)
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in which N. is defined as:
(13) N. =- [log()+ log (1 + P1/P?) + log(l + P+1/P?)] and
is the probability of choosing alternative kunder, the hA assumption.
The variable N. maybethought of as a proxy for alternative—specific un-
observed taste variation, otherwise omitted in the absence of N..
3
Havingconstructed a model that permits but does not require hA,
hA can be tested using either of two approaches:
(1) Hausman and McFadden propose a test using the statistic:
(14) T =°ROU)'[cov(oR) —cov(OU)]t(OR
—
whereO(=(a,) from (5)) is the coefficient vector estimated for the full
model; 0R is the coefficient vector estimated among individuals who selected
a subset of the total choice set; cov(O) refers to the relevantparameter
covariance matrix; and t denotes a generalized inverse. The test statistic
is shown to be distributed Chi—square with two degrees of freedom' and is
interpreted such that a value of T larger than the critical value rejects the
independence of irrelevant alternatives assumption for the specific formula—
2 tion of the model at hand.
1
The relevant degrees of freedom are given by
dftr[cov(OR) —cov(OU)]t[cov(OR)
—cov(8)].
2Hausman and McFadden(1981) make the point that alternative specifications
of explanatory variables might satisfy the hA assumption, asmight alternative
functional relationships.(ii) In the SOL model, N provides an indication of the presence
or absence of hA. If hA holds in the data, the inclusion of N will not
alter results, and the predictions from the SOL model (12) will be identical
to the predictions from the i2L model (8). But if hA does not hold,






where OL and are the predicted frequencies for choice j in the
SOL and MNL models respectively. V is distributed chi—square with J—l
degrees of freedom.
Estimates of both retirement models and tests of hA follow.
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III. Data and Results
A. Data1
To estimate the intertemporal retirement model income available at all
future retirement ages must be recorded for each sample individual.2 Most
previous researchers have not had access to such complete information, and
are able to examine only part!ial income measures at the time of the survey
or, at best, two alternative years.3 The data set we analyze is unique
in that it contains sufficient information for us to be able to construct
the earnings, private pension, and Social Security benefits available to
each worker in the sample for all retirement ages from 60 through 68.
Our sample consists of 390 male employees of a manufacturing firm,
for which the private pension formulas were known. In this firm, pension
formulas are based solely on seniority and age; earnings levels do not
affect benefits at all. These workers retired between theages of 60 and 68,
the latter age being the mandatory retirement age at the firm. We focus on
a specific cohort of individuals born in 1909 and 1910, for two reasons:
all cohort members had reached the age of mandatory retirement (age 68) as
of the survey date (1978), thereby averting truncation bias due to uncompleted
work spells; and also because these workers ware as young as possible while
still having passed the mandatory retirement age, mortality bias is minimized.
'A more detaileddescription of the pension rules and other aspects of
the data source is available in Fields and Mitchell (1982). The larger data
set of which this is a subsample is known as the Benefits Amounts Study,
under development at PWBP/LNSA, U.S. Department of Labor. For an overview of
the variability in existing pension structures, see Lazear (1982).
2For the empirical work in thispaper, we define retirement as the age
of leaving the main employer and accepting a pension.
3Civen thepresent state of data availability, researchers must choose
between comprehensive budget set information and representativeness. In this
paper, we choose the former course, as did Burkhauser (1979) and Burtless and
Hausman (1981).11
Construction of the PDVYs for alternate retirement ages involved several
steps. Past earnings from 1951 on were available from Social Security earnings
histories. We imputed values for earnings beyond the Social Security taxable
maximum and predicted earnings for each worker up to age 68. These were
adjusted for income taxes and Social Security taxes. From the earnings
histories, and from knowledge of the Social Security formulas in effect when
these individuals were age 60 and before, we calculated the streams of Social
Security benefits that these people could have expected to receive for al-
ternate retirement ages. Then, because we knew the pension rules in the
firm in question, we were also able to construct private pension benefits
f or alternate retirement ages.
To illustrate these various components, take as an example a worker with
the mean level of seniority (27 years) who retired at the mean age in this
firm (63 years). This worker would earn $20,600 (in present value terms)
between ages 60 and 63, would receive an expected present value of Social
Security benefits from age 63 onward of $31,900 (after adjusting for time
preference at a nominal rate of 5Z and for mortality probabilities), and
would receive an expected present value of private pension benefits from
age 63 onward of $26,300. The sum of these three components is the present
discountedvalue of income (PDVY) as viewed from age 60If retirement were
to occur at age 63. For the mean individual in our sample, this sum Is $78,900.
Average PDVY's for alternate retirement ages are summarized in Table 1.
PDVY is an increasing function of the retirement age: it rises monotonically
from $57,500 for retirement at age 60 to $101,000 for retirement at age 68.
Thishappens because earnings always exceed the sum ofprivate pensionand
Social Security benefits. However, the PDVY functionis decidedlynon—linear.
Themarginalpayoff to an additionalyear of workdeclines from $7,500TABLE 1.
THE INTERTEMPORALBUDGET SET FOR THEMEAN WORKERIN COMPANY X
PresentDiscounted
Value of Income
(PDVY) from Age 60











between ages 60 and 61 down to $3,000 betweenages 67 and 68. These budget
set nonlinearities are handled quite readily in the discrete choice models
described above.
B. Results
Table 2 presents two sets of coefficient estimates for the retirement
equation. Column 1 contains L results and column 2 SOL results. In
both models, income and leisure have positive and statisticallysignificant
effects, confirming that older workers value more of both when deciding
when to retire.
Despite the fact that the two sets of coefficient estimates appear
similar, it is useful to test formally the assumption of hA as discussed
above. We do so first with the Hausman—McFadden test, based on MNL coefficients
from column 1. These were compared with coefficient estimates obtainedby
re—estimating the model on two different subsets:(a) those choosing
retirement at ages 60 to 65, and (b) those choosing retirement atages
60 to 62. The resultant values of the T statistic given by equation (14)
are:
Comparison Computed Value of T
60—68 versus 60—65 17.2
60—68 versus 60—62 65.8
The critical value of chi—square with 2 degrees of freedom (.005 significance
level) is 10.6. Hence, hA is rejected using this test.
The second test for hA compares coefficients from both MNL and SOL.
For our data, the statistic given by equation (15) takes the value V =69.7,
compared to the critical chi—square value with 8 degrees of freedom (.005
significance level) of 22.0 Hence, hA is rejected by this second test as well.
Rejection of hA by both criteria confirms that the ordered logit
model fits the data better than does a conventional logit setup. ThisagreesTABLE 2.
COEFFICIENT ESTIMATES FOR THE AGE OF RETIREMENT
EQUATION USING MULTINOMIAL LOGIT (MNL) AND SIMPLE ORDERED LOGIT (SOL)
(standard errors in parentheses)
(1) (2)
Variable: MNL SOl.
PDVY (Income) 14.152 14.284
(1.297) (1.445)
RET (Retirement Years) 13.705 13.850
(1.191) (1.385)
N (Pseudo—variable used —.149
to test IIA) (.717)
Log L —730.35 —730.33
14with our theoretical preference for a model that allows covariance among
proximateretirement age alternatives, which SOL does. Hence, the estimated
SOL coefficients from column 2 of Table 2 receive primary emphasis in what
follows though further MNL results are also presented for purposes of com-
parison.
Because estimated utility function coefficients are not directly inter-
pretable, and because the budget set is quite nonlinear, it is useful to
determine how responsive retirement ages are to particular changes in
income parameters. We estimate in turn the effects of sixsuchchanges;
holding all other budget set parameters constant:
Change A: Each worker's earnings stream is increased
by 10% of his base (age 60) earnings amount.
Change B: Each worker's earnings stream is tilted such that
earnings at every age are increased by 10%.
Change C: The pension benefit at each age is increased
by 10% of the age 60 pension amount.
Change D: The slope of the pension function is raised by 10%.
Change E: The Social Security benefit stream is raised by
10% of the initial amount.
Change F: The slope of the Social Security function is
increased by adding 10% to every year's benefits.
Estimated coefficients from Table 2 are used to determine how each
individual would be likely to alter his retirement age if confronted
with these new budget sets. By summing these probabilities across people
and comparing them with initial probabilities, we can evaluate anticipated
retirement age responses to these particular policy changes.
Table 3 reports the findings for these six budget changes. Consider
first the preferred SOL specification in column 1. A 10% increase in
earned income would increase the average retirement age by about 0.2 years,
ceteris paribus. Earnings have both income and substitution effects on the
1516
demand for retirement, and in this formulation, the substitution effect appears
to dominate. On the other hand, changing the private pension and Social Security
benefit structure would reduce retirement ages. For instance, raising
private pension and Social Security benefits by a given amount at each age
(Changes C and E) produces only income effects, which encourages earlier
retirement. An increase of 10% in the age—60 amount is estimated to reduce
the average retirement age by about 0.2 years. The two changes that raise
private pension and Social Security benefits by 10% in every year (Changes D
and F) entail both income and substitution effects, rendering the predicted
effects ambiguous. Empirically, we find that both these changes are estimated
to have negative effects: —.15 years for the private pension case and —.07
years In the case of Social Security. The changes in D and F are less
negative than the changes in C and E, because income effects only are present
In C and E whereas these are partially offset in D and F by substitution
effects in the opposite direction.
To see what difference the econometric specification makes, compare the
MNL results in column 2 of Table 3 with the SOL results (column 1). The
estimated responses from the NML model are much smaller than those based
on the SOL model. This occurs because the S0 model allows nearby alternatives
to be "closer" to the chosen alternative than does the MNL model. Consequently,
when the budget constraint is changed, there is more predicted movement between
retirement ages using the SOL model, as compared to the MNL model, which
assumes hA.TABLE 3.
EFFECT OF BUDGET SET CHANGES ON MEAN AGE OF
RETIREMENT, IN YEARS, FOR SOL AND MNL MODELS
Change in Mean Retirement Age
Preferred Alternative
Specification Specification
Budget Set Change (SOL) (MNL)
Change A: Raise earnings stream by 10% +.19 4.04
of age 60 amount
Change B: Raise earnings stream by 10% +.22 4.05
at each age
Change C: Raise private pension stream —.22 —.05
by 10% of age 60 amount
Change D: Raise private pension stream —.15 —.03
by 10% at each age
Change E: Raise Social Security stream —.19 —.04
by 10% of age 60 amount
Change F: Raise Social Security stream —.07 —.02
by 10% at each age
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IV. Conclusions
In this paper we have developed a qualitative choice model of the economic
incentives to retire and estimated it with a sample of 390 male workers in
one large manufacturing firm. Theory suggests that lifetime leisure and
streams of earnings, private pension benefits, and Social Security benefits
enter into the choice of retirement age. We summarize these streams with
two variables which we observe empirically in our data set: PDVY, the present
discounted value of expected lifetime income from earnings, pensions, and
Social Security associated with each alternative retirementage; and RET,
the expected number of retirement years associated with each retirement
age. Theory also suggests that in addition to PDVY and RET, retirement
ages are affected as well by individuals' preferences for income and
leisure. Though these utility function components are unobservable, they
presumably reflect persistent individual—specific differences in tastes.
"Workaholism"and "leisure—loving" should be accommodated empirically.
Totake account of these determinants, and to allow for the non—linearity
of the lifetime budget set, we formulated a qualitative choice model with
retirement age as the dependent variable. We did not, however, wish to
maintain the multinomial logit model (MNL) with its attendant assumption of
independence from irrelevant alternatives (hA) in the retirement context.
Instead, we estimated a simple ordered logit model (SOL), which allows
for nearby alternatives to be correlated with the alternative chosen.
We performed two tests of hA and rejected hA by both of them. On
this basis, the SOL model is judged to be the preferred specification on
empirical as well as theoretical grounds. SOL coefficient estimates
were then used to evaluate the effects on retirementages of various
changes in the components of lifetime income. We found that, on average,19
raising earnings induces longer worklives, but increases in private pensions
and Social Security benefits induce earlier retirement. Changes of 10% in the
streams of earnings, pensions, or Social Security produce changes in average
retirement ages of about 0.2 years in our sample according to the SOL
estimates. For comparison, we also presented MNL estimates, which are less
warranted for theoretical and empirical reasons, and found much smaller
estimated effects. In future work, we intend to evaluate other data sets
to determine the robustness of these findings.REFERENCES
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